Sunday, February 10, 2008

When Women Rule

I thought I'd share this interesting piece by NY Times columnist Nicholas Kristof. I'd love to hear what people think--do the studies mentioned by Kristof show what is claimed they do? Could there be other explanations? Do people find evidence of such prejudices in their daily lives--do they find themselves, even, thinking and acting on this type of prejudice? If the studies' conclusions are right, could this explain, at least in part, for instance, some of Senator Hillary Clinton's losses in the Democratic primaries? How about the classroom? Do students tend to think less highly of their female professors than of their male ones? Do they tend do evaluate them less highly at the end of the term? If so, what could be done to remedy this situation?

NY Times, February 10, 2008
Op-Ed Columnist

When Women Rule
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF

While no woman has been president of the United States — yet — the world does have several thousand years’ worth of experience with female leaders. And I have to acknowledge it: Their historical record puts men’s to shame.

A notable share of the great leaders in history have been women: Queen Hatshepsut and Cleopatra of Egypt, Empress Wu Zetian of China, Isabella of Castile, Queen Elizabeth I of England, Catherine the Great of Russia, and Maria Theresa of Austria. Granted, I’m neglecting the likes of Bloody Mary, but it’s still true that those women who climbed to power in monarchies had an astonishingly high success rate.

Research by political psychologists points to possible explanations. Scholars find that women, compared with men, tend to excel in consensus-building and certain other skills useful in leadership. If so, why have female political leaders been so much less impressive in the democratic era? Margaret Thatcher was a transformative figure, but women have been mediocre prime ministers or presidents in countries like Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines and Indonesia. Often, they haven’t even addressed the urgent needs of women in those countries.

I have a pet theory about what’s going on.

In monarchies, women who rose to the top dealt mostly with a narrow elite, so they could prove themselves and get on with governing. But in democracies in the television age, female leaders also have to navigate public prejudices — and these make democratic politics far more challenging for a woman than for a man.

In one common experiment, the “Goldberg paradigm,” people are asked to evaluate a particular article or speech, supposedly by a man. Others are asked to evaluate the identical presentation, but from a woman. Typically, in countries all over the world, the very same words are rated higher coming from a man.

In particular, one lesson from this research is that promoting their own successes is a helpful strategy for ambitious men. But experiments have demonstrated that when women highlight their accomplishments, that’s a turn-off. And women seem even more offended by self-promoting females than men are.

This creates a huge challenge for ambitious women in politics or business: If they’re self-effacing, people find them unimpressive, but if they talk up their accomplishments, they come across as pushy braggarts.

The broader conundrum is that for women, but not for men, there is a tradeoff in qualities associated with top leadership. A woman can be perceived as competent or as likable, but not both.

“It’s an uphill struggle, to be judged both a good woman and a good leader,” said Rosabeth Moss Kanter, a Harvard Business School professor who is an expert on women in leadership. Professor Kanter added that a pioneer in a man’s world, like Hillary Rodham Clinton, also faces scrutiny on many more dimensions than a man — witness the public debate about Mrs. Clinton’s allegedly “thick ankles,” or the headlines last year about cleavage.

Clothing and appearance generally matter more for women than for men, research shows. Surprisingly, several studies have found that it’s actually a disadvantage for a woman to be physically attractive when applying for a managerial job. Beautiful applicants received lower ratings, apparently because they were subconsciously pegged as stereotypically female and therefore unsuited for a job as a boss.

Female leaders face these impossible judgments all over the world. An M.I.T. economist, Esther Duflo, looked at India, which has required female leaders in one-third of village councils since the mid-1990s. Professor Duflo and her colleagues found that by objective standards, the women ran the villages better than men. For example, women constructed and maintained wells better, and took fewer bribes.

Yet ordinary villagers themselves judged the women as having done a worse job, and so most women were not re-elected. That seemed to result from simple prejudice. Professor Duflo asked villagers to listen to a speech, identical except that it was given by a man in some cases and by a woman in others. Villagers gave the speech much lower marks when it was given by a woman.
Such prejudices can be overridden after voters actually see female leaders in action. While the first ones received dismal evaluations, the second round of female leaders in the villages were rated the same as men. “Exposure reduces prejudice,” Professor Duflo suggested.
Women have often quipped that they have to be twice as good as men to get anywhere — but that, fortunately, is not difficult. In fact, it appears that it may be difficult after all. Modern democracies may empower deep prejudices and thus constrain female leaders in ways that ancient monarchies did not.

Copyright 2008 The New York Times Company

Sunday, January 27, 2008

Linguistic Intuitions Gone Badly Awry

The intuition that the derogatory content of an epithet scopes out of every linguistic context, regardless of its occurrence (e.g. embedded under negation, in quotation, in fiction, etc.) has lead to the racial harassment charge against Professor Donald Hindley at Brandeis University for his apparent mention, not use, of the term 'wetback'.  In his Fall 2007 Latin American Studies course, Hindley said:

Mexican migrants in the United States are sometimes referred to pejoratively as 'wetbacks'.

Notice that what he said was not only true, but informative and relevant in a discussion about racism.  For details, see Bill Poser's recent entry on the Language Log.

Before we start burning Twain novels from the university library, let's all reread Frege's 'On Sense and Reference' (1892), paragraph 6, along with the First Amendment, shall we?

Update, this quote seems particularly relevant:

“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent.  Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.  The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”

Justice Louis Brandeis, U.S. Supreme Court (dissenting opinion) Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 72 L.Ed. 944, 957, 48 S.Ct. 564, 66 ALR 376 (1928)

Thursday, January 24, 2008

Theories of Beauty - Spring 2008

The blog is open...

Saturday, January 19, 2008

Robot Liars and Altruists!

This is amazing if true. It seems that these bots, programmed only to learn to find "food" and avoid "poison" in competition with other bot-tribes, learned to lie in order to improve their chances. Other bots evidently committed suicide for the sake of their kind!

Thursday, January 17, 2008

Why are our intuitions supposed to have some sort of privileged epistemic status?

I'm not an epistemologist, and my first pass through epistemology as an undergrad mostly left me confused. But I've had this question for a while now: What's so cool about our intuitions? Why is it, in (analytic) philosophy, that if something goes along with our intuitions, it provides some evidence to believe that it may be a more plausible? I noticed last semester that Kripke uses intuitions to get some good work done in Naming and Necessity, and I've heard a couple different professors use intuitions as a basis for some theory they're attempting to advance.

One interesting point is that the "intuitions" that we're supposed to have aren't always shared by everyone, especially non-Westerners. The article I linked to discusses this point in the context of "experimental" philosophy. Specifically, the bottom of page one and the top of page two.

At any rate, I just need someone to explain to me why intuitions do so much work for philosophy. It doesn't seem that other fields (like medicine) would accept people's intuitions as readily, and rightly so. Intuitions can be wrong, and I certainly wouldn't accept someone's intuitions as evidence when it comes to my health or something like that.

Also, it seems to me that such emphasis on intuitions only makes sense given some sort of foundationalist epistemology. At any rate, kindly remove me from the cave on this issue. Thanks.

Wednesday, January 16, 2008

Something Stinks....

Philosophers of mind have been debating for many years whether there are subjective properties of experience --- it is sometimes said that those subjective properties are what make it true that there is "something it's like" to have an experience. (Have a look, for an example, at Thomas Nagel's "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?", Philosophical Review, pp. 435-50.) Well the article in Time magazine (linked from the title of this post), called "My Nose, My Brain, My Faith," reports on some new research suggesting that there may be something it's like to believe and to disbelieve, at least insofar as the brain regions associated with believing and disbelieving also seem to be active when we respond positively or negatively to smells. But philosophers have not traditionally thought that these states have a subjective character.

Thursday, August 30, 2007

History of Aesthetics, Fall 2007

What would Plato say? Blog away!

Philosophy of Film

The thread is now open! *Represent* your thoughts, please. :-)

Wednesday, August 15, 2007

Are we living in somebody's computer simulation?

Hi Everybody,
Check out John Tierney's article in yesterday's New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/14/science/14tier.html?ei=5070&en=258a5f406ca9d607&ex=1187755200&emc=eta1&pagewanted=all) on the possibility that we are all the products of someone's computer simulation. It's hard to take him seriously when he says such a possibility had never occurred to him, when this idea (in various other forms) has been around for so long, not only in philosophy but in fiction as well. To write this and not cite Jorge Luis Borges' "The Circular Ruins," for one, is inexcusable... Well, take a look and let me know what you think of the argument posed by Dr. Bostrom. Is the scenario he envisages really possible?

Thursday, August 02, 2007

Contemporary Aesthetics

Hi All,
As promised, here's a new thread, so you can post your thoughts on the issues discussed in our course. Have fun!

Monday, April 23, 2007

TTU Graduate Philosophy Conference

TTU's first Graduate Student Philosophy Conference begins this Friday at Noon. The topic of the conference is "The Philosophy of Love"; we'll have talks from visiting speakers on romantic love, monogamy, marriage, forgiveness, and more.

On Friday afternoon Andrea Westlund will present the keynote address, entitled "Love and Shared Identity." 5:15 pm, English/Philosophy Room LH01. Professor Westlund (Ph.D. University of Michigan) is a specialist in feminist philosophy, social and political philosophy, ethics, and moral psychology. Her current research is on the moral psychology of friendship and love, with a particular focus on personal autonomy, joint deliberation, and the formation of shared interests and identities.

For more information visit:

http://www.orgs.ttu.edu/philosophygsa/PhilofLove.htm

Or contact Rachel Myers.

Edward Hinchman THIS THURSDAY

The Philosophy Department and PGSA are pleased to announce a colloquium talk:

Edward Hinchman (Wisconsin-Milwaukee)
"The Assurance of Warrant"
7:00pm
Room 264
Thursday, April 26

Hinchman writes: "In "Telling as Inviting to Trust" (PPR, May 2005) I defended a version of what Richard Moran subsequently (Phil. Imprint, September 2005) christened the Assurance View of testimony, according to which the epistemic warrant transmitted through testimony derives from an assurance that the speaker gives her addressee and is therefore unavailable to overhearers. But neither my earlier paper nor Moran's gives an adequate explanation of how the transmission of warrant depends specifically on the speaker's mode of address, making it natural to suspect that the interpersonal element is merely psychological or action-theoretic, rather than epistemic. In the present paper I aim to fill that explanatory gap: to specify exactly how a testifier's assurance can create genuine epistemic warrant."

Tuesday, April 03, 2007

Ann Cudd in the Philosophy Department April 12th and 13th

The Philosophy Department announces two talks by:

Ann Cudd (Universrity of Kansas)

Public Lecture:
"Wanting Freedom"
Thursday, April 12th
7:00, LH01

Abstract: Do humans really desire freedom? If so, why is there so much oppression in the world? In my recent book, Analyzing Oppression, I attempted to explain how and why humans oppress each other and why oppression of some groups continues often for many generations. This explains why we lack freedom. I also argued that none of us is free unless we all are free. But the problem is that we do not seem to really want that freedom, the freedom that comes when all are free. This paper clarifies that problem – the problem of wanting freedom -- and points in the direction of a solution.

Departmental Colloquim:
"Truly Humanitarian Intervention"
Friday, April 13th
3:30, LH01

Abstract: In the standard, just war theory, use of this term, "humanitarian intervention" refers to the use of military force by one nation or group of nations to stop genocide or other gross human rights violations in another sovereign nation. Such purportedly humanitarian intervention, however, often ends up killing innocent civilians, violating the principles of just war theory, and making matters worse. Furthermore, only the most horrible, massive and violent violations of human rights can justify the use of military force against a sovereign nation, and therefore many evils go uncounted, unnoticed, and unmitigated. In this paper I suggest a range of responses to human rights violations that includes military intervention as only one end of the continuum, and to combine this with a greater understanding of the scope of human rights violations that require international response. I offer a new conception of truly humanitarian treatment within and beyond international borders.

Despite the implication, both lectures are open to the public. Info: allan.hazlett@ttu.edu

Monday, March 19, 2007

Existentialist bear criticized by nature-loving a priorists!


German animal-lovers are divided on the issue of "Cute Knut", an orphan polar bear that has (so far) been raised by human beings at the Berlin Zoo. Some argue that the bear should have been euthanized, for "[i]f a polar bear mother rejected the baby, then ... the zoo must follow the instincts of nature." And like-minded others argue that "[t]he animal will be fixated on his keeper and not be a 'real' polar bear," and that being raised by humans is "not appropriate to the species."

As Thom Yorke said, we hope your rules and wisdom choke you. The very idea that a being would be better of dead simply because it's not living a "natural" life -- well, I guess I just can't make sense of it. Let me try to explain why. Here a situation in which it seems like you might be better of dead if you couldn't live a natural life: you're a fish, and you're not allowed to live in water, but when you're outside of water you are in constant pain and suffering from lack of oxygen, and (this may go without saying) you don't have any important Williamsonian ground projects that involve being out of water. If that's you, then you'd be better off dead.

But that is because the unnatural life that you're forced to live is a life of pain and suffering (with no compensation when it comes to the things you really care about). It's not the mere fact that your life is unnatural that makes it a life not worth living. What ultimately explains why your life is not worth living, in that case, is not the fact that your life is unnatural. Rather, it's the pain and suffering.

In the case of a fish, intuitively, there may be nothing more to the good life than pleasure and pain -- any fish life that isn't a life of suffering is a fish life worth living, for a fish. How might other animals -- including humans -- be different? The existentialists (and American sympathizers like Frankfurt, Nagel, and Williams) have an answer to this question: (roughly) human beings have values, i.e. things they love and care about, i.e. projects that give meaning to their lives. On a less grand scale, many animals (including humans) have interests, desires, concerns, preferences. To the extent that you have these sorts of wants (whether they rise to the level of existentially significant "ground projects" or not), your life is worsened by not getting what you want, in the same way that its worsened by pain and suffering. So the question we have to ask about Cute Knut, it seems to me, has nothing to do with the biological nature of bears, and everything to do with what he wants, and whether he's getting it.

Can we attribute to Knut a ground project of wanting to be a "real" bear, according to zoological standards? Of course we can't -- what Knut cares about is getting food, and playing with a toilet brush, or whatever. He could care less about living up to his biological nature, if he even things about such things, which he doesn't -- and that's the real point. What's "natural" can't matter to a being that doesn't (and probably can't) form thoughts about what's "natural." And if it can't matter to Knut, then it can't be the difference maker for whether his is a life worth living.

(Allan Hazlett)

Monday, March 05, 2007

Next Public Lecture: Simon Feldman, March 22nd

The next Public Lecture in the Philosophy Department will be on Thursday, March 22nd, at 7:00 in English/Philosophy LH01. The speaker will be Simon Feldman from Connecticut College. An abstract of his talk is below.

Abstract of "Locating Conscience: Conflict, Integrity and the Limits of Morality":

How demanding are the requirements of morality? If we are permitted to privilege ourselves and our projects at the expense of the impartial good or at the expense of respecting the categorical imperative, what explains this? In "Persons Character and Morality" and "Consequentialism and Integrity" Bernard Williams suggests an "integrity"-based critique of impartial morality. The aims of this talk are three: (1) to attempt to explain Williams' critique of demanding morality, (2) to suggest two ways in which Williams' critique fails (one having to do with his construal of our moral psychology and the other explicitly ethical), and (3) to re-describe our moral psychology in a way that suggests a principled account of our commonsense intuitions about the limits of morality.

Plato = Aristotle?

At his second talk last week Hugh Benson said some things about Plato that made Plato sound a lot like Aristotle. In particular, I got worried that, on Benson's view, a crucial Platonic thesis -- that a well-ordered soul is necessary and sufficient for happiness -- was not actually Plato's view. My suspicions were aroused by some things Benson said about philosophers and political "power", and about knowledge and virtue. All philosophers have political "power", but they don't all live in worlds where this "power" can be manifested; all those who have knowledge have virtue, but they don't all live in worlds where this virtue results in virtuous action. This sounds like luck is playing a big role in whether someone who is internally good (someone who is a philosopher, someone who has knowledge) ends up achieving various external goods (actual political power, an actually virtuous life). That sounds like Aristotle.

But my worries were appeased (as they so often are!) at the bar, later that day. Here is a picture of the difference between Aristotle and Plato, which Benson tentatively approved. The two philosophers agree that there are three sorts of goods you can attain:

1. You can be internally good (i.e. have a "well-ordered soul" by being philosophically reflective)
2. You can be virtuous (in the sense that you can have a virtuous character, in the sense that you are disposed towards right action and emotion, i.e. you can have the capacity for living a virtuous life).
3. You can actually live a virtuous life, and get properly rewarded for it.

They agree that those are three goods that you can attain. And they also agree that (1) is sufficent for (2) -- a controversial claim in its own right. And they agree that (2) is not sufficient for (3), since it takes some contingent luck for (2) to lead to (3).

What they disagree about is which of (1) - (3) is necessary and sufficient for happiness, or living a good life. Plato thinks that (2) is sufficient for happiness (along with (1), of course), but Aristotle thinks that (3) is necessary as well. So Plato does endorse the controversial (and false!) Platonic thesis that an internally "well-ordered soul" is sufficient for happiness, since satisfying (1) and (2) is an internal matter; it requires no "cooperation from the world," it requires (for Plato, at least) no luck. And Aristotle does deny this thesis, since satisfying (3) is an external matter; it requires "cooperation from the world," it requires luck.

(Allan Hazlett)

Thursday, January 18, 2007

Philosophy of Literature - Spring 2007

Dear Students,
It's time to blog! Welcome to Philosophy of Literature. The thread for our course is now open, so you can discuss our course topics by clicking on 'comment'. I look forward to your entries.
Enjoy the forum,
Prof. Ribeiro

Saturday, December 16, 2006

Why do students plagiarize?

Below is a recent post from the Chronicle of Higher Education on student plagiarism. The author makes a point I have always thought right: that to plagiarize in such an effective way that you won't get caught, you need precisely the reading and writing skills that would render plagiarism unnecessary--i.e., you would know how to write a paper yourself. Indeed, I think that a corollary of that claim is that it would take more work to plagiarize a paper well enough to avoid suspicion than it would to write one's own work.

As our semester closes, and many students have had to write term papers for their courses, I'd be interested in hearing their thoughts on why students plagiarize, what they think of those who do, what conditions in a course or school make it more likely that they will, and what would need to be done to change that trend and stop those practices, especially when the internet makes it so easy to engage in them.

Happy Holidays to all.
Anna

http://chronicle.com/jobs/news/2006/12/2006121101c/careers.html
Monday, December 11, 2006
How Dumb Do They Think We Are?
By Jonathan Malesic

It happened more times last year than I can even recall, but I clearly remember the first time. I was grading a paper and came across a sentence that surprised me. It just didn't fit in with what I had read up to that point. I was surprised partly because the sentence made proper use of the word "implacable," whereas in the paragraph before, the student had used an abstract noun ending in "-ship" as a verb. Twice.

I read more and found more seismic shifts in the writing style. Magisterial paragraphs were followed by inane ones; syllogisms gave way to circular logic, and back again. I picked one suspect sentence, entered it into an Internet search engine, and in milliseconds, I found it -- word for word, punctuation mark for punctuation mark. It turned out much of the rest of the paper had been plagiarized from the same document.

I deduced that the student had also performed a "find-and-replace" function on one key word in the document to make paragraphs that were on a different topic seem as if they were on the topic I had assigned.

Did this cheeky twerp think I wouldn't notice? For an hour after I found the paper's origin, I could only sit in my office and stew, comparing the paper to the Internet version again and again and determining that, at most, one paragraph was entirely original to the student.

My anger then turned into self-questioning. What did I do to this student to deserve such an insult? How had I failed as a teacher, to make the student think that stealing someone else's words was acceptable?

Since I was a new assistant professor, I sought my colleagues' advice about the paper. They sympathized, they shared my indignation, but as I calmed down, they also told me that I shouldn't take it personally. Apparently I would be seeing cases like this again. Senior colleagues gave matter-of-fact appraisals of just how many plagiarized papers I could expect in a given class of 25 students.

They were right. Throughout the year, I saw plagiarized papers in nearly every stack I read. At times, I started to think that maybe every paper was plagiarized.

My extreme and irrational reaction to that first plagiarized paper was partly the result of my having been unprepared for it. I had seen a case or two of cheating when I was a teaching assistant, but it didn't seem like a personal affront. After all, it wasn't my class. Cheating was the professor's problem, so I felt no need to look for explanations.

There are probably dozens of reasons why some students plagiarize. They're lazy. They're afraid. They perceive plagiarism to be standard practice at their college. They believe that any means to a good grade are legitimate.

What's most astounding, though -- and most insulting -- is that students plagiarize in ways that are so easy to catch. They cut and paste without thinking to cover their tracks. They copy from the most obvious sources possible. They find and replace words and then do not proofread to ensure clarity.

Do they think we're stupid? If they're going to plagiarize, why can't they at least do it in a way that acknowledges that their audience is intelligent? Don't they know what the big framed diplomas on our walls mean?

I think that student plagiarists are often poor plagiarists because they don't realize that it's even possible to be a savvy reader, that it's possible to read a text that has been cobbled together from multiple sources and determine where one source's contribution ends and another's begins. Those students don't pay attention to diction, syntax, or tone when they read, so they can't possibly imagine that someone else might.

If that is, in fact, what goes on (or, rather, doesn't go on) in our students' minds when they are copying material from the Internet, then we may have run into an example of a broad human tendency to take our individual selves as the standard by which we judge everyone else.

The philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach noticed that tendency, explaining the difference between two bad poets like this: "He who, having written a bad poem, knows it to be bad, is in his intelligence, and therefore in his nature, not so limited as he who, having written a bad poem, admires it and thinks it good."

If Feuerbach is right, then by showing our students what good work is, helping them discover what makes it good work, and explaining how we can very clearly tell the difference between good and bad work, or the relative differences between two authors, we are not only improving their minds, but improving their "natures." That is a lofty word, one that even humanities professors (maybe especially humanities professors) hesitate to utter. But maybe we can agree at least that we can try to broaden students' perspectives and raise their standards, so that they can be better critics -- and better self-critics.

Students can't entirely be blamed for the narrow-mindedness they come to college with, but they absolutely can be blamed for persisting in it in the face of their colleges' best efforts to expand their horizons.

Plagiarism is, therefore, not only dishonest; it is also a sign of students' shamefully entrenched satisfaction with their limitations.

I no longer see cases of blatant plagiarism as personal insults. They are, instead, the pathetic bleats of students who think they know enough -- maybe all there really is to know -- about how to read and think and write.

The paradox of plagiarism is that in order to be really good at it, you need precisely the reading and writing skills that ought to render plagiarism unnecessary. If my students could recognize what differentiates their own writing styles from those of authors whose work they find online, then they should also be able to perform with ease all the tasks I require for their essay assignments: to read texts carefully, to determine the relative importance of textual evidence, to formulate a clear thesis, and to defend it convincingly.

I'll grant that my hypothesis that students plagiarize so obviously because they are unable to imagine someone noticing does not cover all cases. I have caught even students whose other work and class participation exhibit exactly the skills that ought to obviate the perceived need to plagiarize. Maybe I should be insulted by those students: They know better and still try to fool me.

I believe in relentlessly exercising my students' critical abilities, but I also believe in punishing plagiarism. A student who plagiarizes refuses to be educated. There shouldn't be room in my classroom for that kind of student. Indeed, that person is not really a student at all.

Jonathan Malesic is an assistant professor of theology at King's College, in Wilkes-Barre, Pa.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright © 2006 by The Chronicle of Higher Education

Tuesday, November 14, 2006

Classical Greek Philosophy Blog

Hi Everyone,
Jordan has posted a question on Aristotle's four causes. Check it out by clicking on "comments" below or "Classical Greek Philosophy Blog" above.

To the right you can see a 5th-century Greek coin showing the owl of Athena (whom the Romans called 'Minerva'). Athena, named after the city of Athens, was the goddess of wisdom, but also of arts and crafts and of war. According to ancient Greek mythology, Athena sprang fully grown from the head of her father, Zeus, the ruler of all other gods in the Olympus. The owl is her sacred bird because it is a symbol of wisdom.

History of Aesthetics Blog

Hello Good People,
Arthur has posted an invitation to discuss your summaries. Check it out by clicking on "comments" below or "History of Aesthetics Blog" above.

Here's a little art to get your brain juices flowing. I'm big fan of hands (perhaps Rodin & Camille Claudell are to blame). This one is by John Singleton Copley, an American painter (1738-1815). It is a detail from his Epes Sargent, ca. 1760 (National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC; image from www.artstor.org).